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Financial constraints in transition countries 
Roxana Radulescu

 
Newcastle University Business School 
 
Abstract: What role do credit constraints have in transition economies? The existing 
literature suggests that credit constraints have become a problem after the fall of 
communism and do so mostly by showing that a relationship between cash flow and 
investment exists at the firm level. Few papers try to look in detail at the kind of credit 
constraints that the firms face and analyse their effect on firms’ activities. This paper uses 
firm level data to present evidence on the extent and impact of credit constraints in a large 
number of transition economies. The key finding is that the highest percentage of credit 
rationed firms is found in the CIS (25%), followed by CEE (18%) and then Western and 
Southern Europe (8%). It seems that credit constraints have an effect on firm investment, 
employment growth, technology and the upgrading of products, and this effect is stronger 
in the transition countries. These results have implications for monetary policy by 
providing evidence that the availability of bank lending matters for economic activity but 
this channel of transmission may be stronger in countries with less reformed banking 
systems. Results for non-transition economies suggest that as the transition countries 
continue their reform process the strength of this channel will decrease. 
                                                 

Many thanks to Lynne Evans for her support in developing the paper.  
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1. Introduction 
Credit constraints in transition countries have been a topic for research since the 
fall of Communism. The rudimentary organisation of the banking system under the 
old regime became a problem for the development of a new private sector at the 
beginning of the transition from planning to market. Banking reform allowed for the 
increase in financial intermediation but the pace of change could not keep up with the 
increase in demand for financing. On the other hand the hardening of budget 
constraints was necessary for improving the allocation of resources. Credit constraints 
were viewed both as an obstacle to economic growth and as a much needed correction 
to the system. 
Modigliani and Miller (1958) argue that in a perfect financial market the source 
of financing for investment does not matter. In other words firms should be indifferent 
between financing their investment from internal or external sources. With financial 
market imperfections outside finance becomes more expensive and firms tend to rely 
more on internal sources of finance. Market imperfections limit firms’ access to 
outside finance, in which case the firm can arguably be considered as credit 
constrained. In this sense, all firms are credit constrained. In a more narrow sense, 
credit constraints denote situations in which lending is impaired by the existence of 
asymmetric information between lender and borrower. In this case, although a firm 
may be willing to pay the cost of borrowing, it is nevertheless denied access to credit.  
In the presence of credit constraints firms become more reliant on internal 
sources of finance, which introduces a link between cash flow and measures of a 
firm’s level of activity. Early literature on transition countries suggests that these 
economies were affected by a credit crunch immediately after the fall of Communism, 
as the banking systems were reorganised and the lending risk increased (see Calvo 
and Coricelli (1993 and 1995), who suggest that the increase in inter-enterprise 
arrears in this period was a symptom of the credit crunch). With the development of 
the financial markets the credit constraints started to ease and research interest shifted 
elsewhere. More recent work, facilitated by the availability of data on firm financing 
has revived the analysis of the role of financial constraints on the growth of firms. 
In this paper I present relevant empirical evidence on the existence and effects 
of credit constraints in transition countries. The analysis focuses on the following 
main questions: 
 What kind of credit constraints exist in post-communist economies 
relative to Western market economies? 
 Are firms in Central and Eastern Europe less likely to expand their 
activity as a result of credit constraints? How do transition countries 
compare with older market economies in this regard? 
The analysis is based on firm-level surveys carried out in 2004 and 2005, 
covering five Western European (WE) countries, and 26 countries in Central and 
Eastern Europe (CEE) and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). In CEE 
and CIS results show evidence of a correlation between the likelihood of investing in 
fixed assets and whether firms are price rationed, although not quantity rationed. The 
analysis also suggests that rationed firms in Eastern Europe are less likely to expand 
their labour force, upgrade their products and invest in new technology. In WE on the 
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other hand the price and quantity rationing are not as prevalent and they tend to have 
weaker effects on firm activity. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: in section two I clarify the use of 
the notion of credit constraints and give an overview of existing literature. Section 
three discusses the data and summary statistics. Section four analyses the extent of 
credit rationing and presents and comparison between the CEE and CIS countries with 
WE. Section five presents and interprets the regression results. Section six concludes 
the paper.  
 
2. Definitions and previous studies on credit rationing 
There are several definitions of credit rationing in the literature, which generate 
some degree of ambiguity about the meaning of the term. Jaffee and Stiglitz (1990, 
p847) define credit rationing as excess demand for credit at the going interest rate. 
They point out that this description captures several different types of credit rationing: 
1. Interest rate rationing: a borrower is not willing to pay the interest rate (and 
other costs) associated with the size of loan that he/she wants. 
2. Divergent views rationing: borrowers think the interest rate charged by the 
bank is too high relative to the risk of the loan, i.e. the borrower’s estimate of his/her 
own risk is lower than the bank’s.  
3. Redlining: borrowers are denied credit because the maximum return they can 
generate is below the minimum required by the bank. 
4. Pure credit rationing: among identical borrowers some obtain funding and 
some do not, although the rejected borrowers are prepared to pay the required interest 
rate and the other costs associated with borrowing. 
The first two types of credit rationing are variants of price rationing in the sense 
that borrowers are not willing to pay the interest rate required by the bank for one 
reason or another. The last two types are variants of quantity rationing in the sense 
that firms are willing to pay at least the required interest rate but they cannot get 
credit. 
The four types of credit rationing have implications for the transmission of 
monetary policy. Contractionary monetary policy has two effects on the economy via 
the financial system. On the one hand, the increase in interest rates reduces 
investment and consequently reduces the demand for loans as less profitable projects 
are not worth undertaking. This is the interest rate / money channel, which 
corresponds to the first two types of credit rationing. On the other hand a monetary 
contraction can reduce the supply of loans making the last two types of credit 
rationing more likely. This is the credit / lending channel (see Cechetti (1995) for a 
discussion).  
Distinguishing between the four types of credit rationing at the empirical level 
is difficult. One early line of research analyses the relationship between investment 
and cash flow (see the seminal papers of Fazzari et al. (1988) Bond and Meghir 
(1994) and the survey by Hubbard (1998), or the evidence presented by Lizal and 
Svejnar (2002), Perotti and Vesnaver (2003) and Dobrinski (2007) for a number of 
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post-communist countries), suggesting that firms tend to rely on internal finance for 
investment in fixed assets because external finance is more expensive.
1
 This link is 
indicative of the existence of price rationing (see Parker (2002)) rather than quantity 
rationing.  
Another line of research tries to identify the existence of quantity constraints as 
part of a lending channel by using aggregate data. Gertler and Gilchrist (1992) look at 
how the mix of small and large firms in an economy can affect the strength of the 
credit channel. They show that small firms are more dependent on bank finance than 
large firms, therefore the credit channel acts disproportionately through these small 
firms. Indeed they find evidence that small firms are more affected by changes in 
monetary policy. The effect of monetary policy on the economy via the credit channel 
is analysed by Bernanke and Blinder (1992), Kashyap et al. (1993), Miron et al. 
(1994) among others. Summarising these attempts Cechetti (1994) concludes that the 
combined problems of identifying monetary policy and distinguishing movements in 
loan supply from changes in loan demand make the credit channel difficult to detect at 
the aggregate level. 
Finding evidence of quantity rationing from firm data has also encountered 
problems. Perez (1998) uses US firm data between 1981 and 1991 to test for excess 
demand on the credit market and finds that around 60% of the firms in the sample 
demand credit in excess of what the banks are willing to provide. On the other hand 
Levenson and Willard (2002) attempting to measure the extent of pure credit rationing 
for US small firms in 1987-1988 finds that only 6.36% of the firms are rejected by 
banks or discouraged from applying for loans for fear of rejection. The Perez (1998) 
and Levenson and Willard (2002) figures cover both redlining and pure credit 
rationing. Such a gap between estimates suggests that the results are very much 
dependent on the methodology used.
2
 Indirect tests detect evidence of quantity 
rationing by analysing the stickiness of loan rates but such indirect tests cannot 
provide us with an estimate of the extent of credit rationing.
3
  
In transition economies tight credit has been blamed for the sharp fall in output 
at the beginning of the 90s. To curb inflation, governments in CEE and CIS kept some 
degree of control over the banking system in an attempt to manage the interest rates 
and the amount of credit in the economy (see the discussion of early policies in 
Poland by Calvo and Coricelli (1992)). Papers found evidence that the explosion of 
inter-enterprise arrears at the beginning of transition can be explained by the sharp fall 
in the real amount of bank credit, which forced firms to find other sources of finance. 
A lively debate on trade credit characterises the early part of transition (see, Calvo 
and Coricelli (1992 and 1993) and Coricelli (1996) for Poland, Abel and Siklos 
(1994) for Hungary, and Perotti and Carare (1996) for Romania). Some governments 
                                                 
1
 Kaplan and Zingales (1997) criticise this line of research by showing how in Fazzari et al. 
(1988) the significance of cash flow for investment had little to do with credit rationing but was 
indicative of the investment opportunities available to firms. 
2
 Parker (2002) points out the difficulties involved in quantifying the extent of credit rationing 
and suggest that the Perez (1998) results are reliant on his assumptions about the distribution of loans 
and interest rates. Based on this, the Levenson and Willard (2002) figures look more reliable, 
suggesting that quantity rationing is unlikely to present major problems for small firms in the US. 
3
 For example Berger and Udell (1992) use indirect tests on the stickiness of commercial loan 
rates and the proportion of commitment loans in the US between 1977 and 1988 and find that quantity 
rationing is unlikely to be a significant macroeconomic phenomenon. 
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tolerated the increase in arrears (which eventually accumulated in the state-owned 
utilities or materialised in tax arrears) as a way of avoiding even larger falls in output. 
By the end of the 90s the amount of arrears in CEE was falling and attention had 
moved away from the credit rationing issue.  
Banking reform progressed slowly in transition countries, lagging behind 
privatisation, and price and trade liberalisation. As a result, the expansion of bank 
loans has been slower than the growth of output (see Fries and Taci (2002)). This 
raises questions about the existence of credit rationing and the impact that this might 
have on the growth of these economies. 
Firm studies of investment undertaken by Lizal and Svejnar (2002), Perotti and 
Vesnaver (2003), and Dobrinski (2007) among others suggest that firms across CEE 
and CIS face hard budget constraints in the sense that they do not have easy access to 
low cost sources of finance from outside and as a result have to rely on retained 
profits for investment. This evidence is compatible with the existence of price 
rationing but it does not tackle the issue of redlining or pure credit rationing.  
The firm surveys undertaken by the World Bank in a large number of countries 
including transition countries in 1990-2000 revived the research into the constraints 
affecting firms, including financial constraints. A number of papers investigate the 
effect of firms’ perceptions of financial constraints on firms’ growth rates in a large 
number of countries, both developed and developing (see for example Beck et al. 
(2005), Beck and Demirguc-Kunt (2006) and Ayyagari et al. (2006) among many 
others). These papers focus on firms’ perceptions about the severity of the constraints 
they face regarding the availability and cost of finance. They find that firms reporting 
higher financing obstacles tend to grow slower and they conclude that in such cases 
financing obstacles are binding because the perceived obstacles have a real effect.  
This paper differs from previous empirical work on credit rationing in that it 
uses the unique features of the BEEPS database to examine the incidence of credit 
rationing in transition compared to several non-transition countries and analyse the 
empirical implications of credit rationing for firm activity. The present study uses 
more recent data collected by the BEEPS survey in 2004 and 2005. Firms were asked 
detailed questions about their sources of finance, in particular bank finance. The 
database makes it possible to identify not only the firms whose application for bank 
loans were accepted or rejected by banks, but also the firms that did not apply for 
credit together with the reasons for their lack of interest in obtaining a bank loan. The 
difference between the present paper and the ones based on the World Bank survey, 
apart from the more recent dataset and the focus on transition countries, is the use of 
data regarding the actual relation between firms and banks rather than firms’ 
perceptions about the constraints that they might be facing.  
 
3. The data 
The BEEPS survey was designed by the World Bank and EBRD and 
administered by specialised firms in each country. It was carried out in March and 
April 2005 for 26 CEE and CIS economies. The survey was also administered to five 
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non-transition economies between October 2004 and September 2005.
4
 The number 
of firms interviewed is 9098 in CEE and CIS, and 2969 in WE. Table 1 gives country 
summary statistics by size of firm, ownership and sector indicating the level of GDP 
for each country. The minimum number of firms surveyed in each country is 200. The 
survey covers firms in industry (i.e. manufacturing, mining and quarrying, and 
construction) and services (i.e. transport, storage and communication, real estate, 
renting and business services, hotels and restaurants, wholesale, retail, repairs) but 
excludes the sectors that are heavily regulated such as banking, electricity supply, rail 
transport, water and waste water. The number of firms in each sector was chosen to 
reflect the sector’s contribution to GDP.  
Regarding the size of the firms included, most of them are small (2 - 50 
employees) and a minimum of 10% are large (500 - 10,000 employees). The wide 
coverage of small enterprises is an advantage of the database, since previous literature 
suggests that credit constraints may fall harder on small firms. Around 70% of firms 
in CEE and CIS and 78% in WE are in this category. Other papers analysing financial 
constraints also concentrate on small firms (see Levenson and Willard (2000), 
Ayyagari et al. (2006) and Beck and Demirguc-Kunt (2006) among others). 
In terms of ownership the survey aimed to have at least 10% of firms in the state 
owned category. While this was generally achieved in CEE and CIS, the 10% target 
was impossible to reach in WE where state owned enterprises are few relative to the 
rest. An important aspect for loan applications is the age of the firm. The survey 
excluded firms that began operating in 2002 and after, so the sample includes only 
firms with at least three years of activity (see Synovate (2005) for details of the 
survey specification).
5
 
The survey allows firms to be classified into non-rationed, price rationed (the 
first two definitions in Jaffee and Stiglitz (1990)) and quantity rationed (the last two 
definitions). Some overlap between these two categories is possible. Appendix 1 
presents the relevant questions.  
 
4. The extent of credit rationing 
The first goal is to distinguish between rationed and non-rationed firms, in order 
to get a measure of the degree of credit rationing existent in these economies. Firms 
are regarded as non-rationed if they satisfy one of the following conditions:  
 had a bank loan in 2002 or after,  
 state that they do not need a loan although they have no cost concerns 
about applying for bank loans.  
                                                 
4
 The transition economies included in the survey are Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, FR Yugoslavia, Macedonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Poland, Romania, Slovak Republic, Slovenia in CEE, and Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan in CIS. 
The non-transition economies are Germany, Greece and Portugal, surveyed in October and November 
2004, and Spain and Ireland surveyed from June to September 2005. 
5
 This is relevant for credit rationing as new firms may be perceived as being more risky. 
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As a result firms that had a loan in the past but paid it back before 2002 were dropped 
from the sample because there is no way to know whether they are rationed.  
Second, it is necessary to identify the firms that are credit rationed in some way. 
Price rationed firms are those that did not apply for a loan because of cost concerns 
such as high interest rates, high collateral, burdensome application procedures or 
informal payments. Quantity rationed firms are those discouraged by the expectation 
of rejection and those actually rejected by the bank. Firms are allowed to state more 
than one reason for not applying for loans, which means they may declare that they 
are discouraged and also that they have cost concerns. These firms are classed as price 
rationed but the robustness of the regression results was checked by re-classifying 
them as quantity rationed.  
Table 2 shows the number of firms in the three categories: non-rationed, price 
rationed and quantity rationed.
6
 Price rationing is a problem for 14.2% of firms in 
CEE and 21.4% of firms in CIS. These figures are much higher than in WE countries, 
where only 5.2% of firms declare themselves as price rationed. The averages hide a 
great deal of variation between countries, with only 4.1% of firms in Slovenia being 
price rationed compared to more than a third of firms in Azerbaijan. Ireland stands out 
in WE with only 1.7%, while the highest figure in WE is found in Portugal, with 
9.9%. 
By comparison, quantity rationing does not appear to be a major problem in any 
of the regions under analysis. In both CEE and CIS 3.6% of firms are likely to be 
quantity rationed, while 2.7% of firms in WE suffer from this. While there is some 
degree of variation across countries the maximum achieved is in Azerbaijan, with 
7.7%. Surprisingly in West Germany the figure is quite high, with 5.9% of firms 
likely to be quantity rationed. This figure is the highest in WE and higher than in most 
transition countries. 
Given that asymmetric information between banks and firms is the cause of 
rationing it would be useful to get a measure of the degree of asymmetric information 
in these economies. The quantity-rationed firms are those that are willing to pay the 
cost of borrowing but get rejected or do not apply in the first place because they think 
they will get rejected. In the extreme, if asymmetric information is not a problem, I 
would expect no rejections because firms know when they are able to obtain loans. 
The percentage of rejected firms relative to the total number of firms that are quantity 
rationed can thus be used as a measure of the degree of asymmetric information.
7
 The 
last two columns of Table 2 present this information. Figures above 50% indicate a 
higher number of rejected compared to discouraged firms and therefore are a sign of 
serious information asymmetries. Indeed in a number of countries there are no 
discouraged firms (however, as a small number of firms enters the calculation in these 
countries, the percentages should be treated with care). The regional averages show 
similarity between the CEE and CIS, with over 70% of the quantity-rationed firms 
being rejected, while only 9.6% of firms in the WE sample are in this situation. 
Indeed, in Greece and Ireland there are no rejections at all. These comparisons are in 
the expected direction, with the more sophisticated banking systems in the old market 
                                                 
6
 The quantity rationing measure in the table is a conservative estimate of quantity rationing. 
7
 I would like to thank Francis Kiraly for this suggestion. 
 8 
economies being better at reducing the problem of asymmetric information in the 
relationship between banks and firms. 
These figures suggest that the degree of credit rationing should be correlated 
with the extent of banking reform. Figure 1 shows the correlation between the 
banking reform index provided by the EBRD (2005) and the figures in Table 1 for 
transition countries only. The index of banking reform varies between 1 (for an 
unreformed country) to 4.3 (market economy standard). While all countries have 
undertaken some reform (Tajikistan has the lowest score at 1.7), none achieved the 
standard found in a market economy by 2004 (the most advanced reformers are 
Croatia, Estonia and Hungary with a score of 4). There appears to be a strong 
correlation between banking reform and price rationing, with firms in advanced 
reformers facing less price rationing. However, without the WE economies in the 
figure there does not appear to be much correlation between banking reform and 
quantity rationing, or asymmetric information. It appears that the degree of quantity 
rationing and asymmetric information is higher across the board in transition 
countries compared with WSE, regardless of their progress with reform.  
 
5. The impact of credit rationing on firm activity 
The third goal is to analyse the effect that credit rationing has on firm activity. If 
credit rationing affects firms, this should be reflected in the growth of their inputs 
such as capital, labour and technology. The BEEPS 2005 survey contains information 
about the change in fixed assets and new technology, and the growth rate of full-time 
employment between 2002 and 2005.  
Firms were asked about the direction of change in fixed assets and the number 
of full time employees, and whether the firm introduced any new technologies or 
upgraded existing products in the past three years. The percentage change in fixed 
assets is available for some firms but the response rate is smaller (approximately 300 
firms did not declare the exact change). The non-response problem appears only for 
those firms whose investment differs from zero therefore any estimation would have 
to take into consideration this source of bias. The percentage growth rate for full-time 
employment is provided but it is again likely that some of the managers interviewed 
did not know the exact figure or were reluctant to declare it. Firms were not asked 
about the amount invested in new technology or in developing their product range. 
The appropriate methodology was selected in order to deal with the quality of 
the data available. The question asked is whether the propensity of a firm to expand 
its activity in the three years previous to the interview is affected by credit rationing. 
The dependent variables are dummies that take the value one if the firm expanded its 
fixed assets, increased its labour force, invested in new technology or upgraded its 
product structure and zero otherwise. As the left hand side variables are categorical, 
the most appropriate method of estimation is probit. The standard errors are calculated 
using the robust estimator and adjusted for correlation or errors within each country. 
The variables of interest on the right hand side are the two dummies identifying firms 
that are likely to be price or credit rationed, against the omitted category of non-
rationed firms. The regressions also examine the impact of firm size, ownership, 
sector of activity and subsidies from national, regional or local government. 
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An issue that must be addressed in the empirical work is the endogeneity of the 
credit rationing variables. It is possible that only the dynamic firms in the sample, 
with better quality of management or better market opportunities, appear to be credit 
rationed because these are the firms that need outside financing. On the other hand, 
less dynamic firms, or firms with fewer opportunities for investment do not appear 
rationed. The design of the questionnaire makes it possible to control for this problem 
by identifying firms that do not apply for loans because they do not need a loan. 
These firms are more likely to be less dynamic and are classed as non-rationed.
8
 It is 
important that firms were allowed to declare multiple reasons for not applying for a 
loan, which excludes the possibility that firms declaring no need for bank financing 
prefer to rely on profits because in reality they are cost constrained.  
Table 3 examines the links between firms’ activity and credit rationing. The 
table shows the probit estimates of the determinants of a firm’s decision to invest in 
fixed assets, labour, improved products and technological developments. The 
coefficients show the marginal effect, i.e. the discrete change in the probability as the 
right hand side variables are all dichotomous. Price and quantity rationing are 
introduced separately, with non-rationed firms being the missing category. Results 
cover the CEE and CIS countries only and account for firm size, ownership, sector, 
and for the presence of subsidies from the local or national government.
9
  
The results show a considerable effect of credit rationing on firm activity. Both 
measures are negatively related to firm activity and both are significant across the 
board. Small and medium firms generally invest less than large ones in all respects, 
while de novo and privatised firms tend to invest more than state owned enterprises. 
Perhaps surprisingly, government subsidies are only related to investment in fixed 
assets and have no impact on the other aspects of firm investment. Finally, the results 
show that firms in industry invest significantly more than their counterparts in 
services.  
To provide a comparison with the non-transition economies, Table 4 presents 
the results of the same regressions for the five non-transition economies. For these 
economies the impact of credit rationing appears to be less significant. The results are 
different for price and quantity rationing – price rationing is never significant, while 
quantity rationing has no effect on investment in fixed assets and new technology, a 
negative impact on employment growth and surprisingly a strong positive effect on 
the upgrading of products. We can conclude that credit rationing is less prevalent in 
                                                 
8
 Some of the firms that do not need a loan report cost concerns as well, however their 
investment is unlikely to be affected by rationing. Only firms that reportedly needed a loan and had 
cost concerns are classed as price rationed. Results were checked for robustness by dropping firms that 
do not apply for a bank loan for cost reasons and also do not need a loan (221 firms are in this 
situation). 
9
 The existence of firm profits is also likely to affect investment. The questionnaire gives 
information on whether a firm had profits in 2003, which is in the middle of the period of analysis and 
is likely to be endogenous to investment in capital, labour and technology, which are measured over the 
three year prior to the interview. Results were checked for robustness by adding a dummy for profits 
and the results are quite similar. The only notable difference is the lack of significance of the rationing 
variables in the regression for employment growth.  
 10 
WSE and also, those firms affected by credit rationing are less likely to reduce their 
investment in response.
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It can be argued that the lack of impact of price rationing on non-transition 
economies is due to the higher level of banking competition in these economies, 
which is likely to drive down the cost of borrowing. This may materialise in lower 
real interest rates, less bureaucracy in the application process and the elimination of 
bribes, all of which are part of the cost of borrowing for the firms in the sample. It is 
also possible that the real interest rates are lower in non-transition economies to 
reflect the lower level of inflation and the lower systemic risk associated with doing 
business in these countries, although with hindsight this may have been misplaced.  
 
6. Conclusion and extensions 
In this paper I examine the extent and impact of credit rationing in 26 transition 
countries and five non-transition countries in Western Europe using firm level data. 
The empirical results show that about 18% of firms in CEE and 25% of firms in CIS 
are credit rationed, with only 8% of non-transition country firms being in this 
situation. Thus the problem appears to be more severe in transition countries. Among 
credit rationed firms in transition countries the majority are price rationed (14% for 
CEE and 21% for CIS) and only a small minority are quantity rationed (3.6% in both 
CEE and CIS). Interestingly, the share of price rationed firms appears to be lower in 
countries that have reformed their banking systems but quantity rationing is 
uncorrelated with the extent of reform.  
I also find a strong impact of credit constraints on firm investment activities: not 
only are firms less likely to invest in fixed assets and new technology, but also they 
are less likely to increase the number of employees and upgrade their existing 
products. While quantity rationing seems to have a bigger impact on the propensity to 
invest, this is mitigated by the relatively small number of firms in this situation. By 
comparison, non-transition countries produce weaker results; price rationing has no 
impact, while quantity rationing has an impact comparable to that evident in transition 
countries only on employment growth. Rather unexpectedly it appears that quantity 
rationed firms in non-transition countries are more inclined to upgrade their products. 
Overall, the results support the view that financial constraints are more 
prevalent in transition countries than in old market economies and also have more 
impact on firm activity. While banking reform appears to have removed some of the 
constraints, there is still a big gap even between advanced reformers such as Hungary 
and the non-transition economies. 
While the findings of this paper have policy implications, care must be 
exercised in interpreting the conclusions. While price and quantity rationing reduce 
the potential for firm growth, there is no evidence that the outcome is inefficient. In 
the case of price rationing it is the firms with lower expected returns and higher risk 
                                                 
10
 I cannot explain why the quantity rationed firms are more likely to upgrade their products. 
Perhaps the lack of external funding makes these firms more likely to restructure their activity and 
doing this by upgrading existing products is cheaper than investing in new technology.  
11
 The robustness of the results was checked by adding a dummy for the existence of profits in 
2003, and by weighting the observations according the size of GDP in 2004 with similar results. 
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that are dropping out of the loan market. In the case of quantity rationing firms 
declare that they are rejected by banks on the basis of creditworthiness, in which case 
banks are simply exercising their screening role. As pure credit rationing is difficult to 
detect, the effect on efficiency is unclear. However, efficient or not, there is evidence 
that a credit channel exists in transition countries. In the future though, this channel 
may become weaker as transition countries further reform their banking systems 
towards the standards found in other European countries. 
The analysis will be extended to show how the outcomes for transition countries 
evolved between 2002 and 2005 and the robustness of the results will be tested using 
a small panel of firms that were interviewed in 2002 and again in 2005. The panel will 
allow the introduction of other control variables such as the existence of profits at the 
beginning of the period. Also there is potential for looking in more detail at the 
decision of banks to reject applications by comparing firms that were rejected with 
those that received loans in order to try and identify whether there is any evidence of 
pure credit rationing. 
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Table 1 
Sample structure – summary statistics 
 Ownership Size Sector Total number of 
firms 
GDP in 2004 
(bil. USD) 
 De novo Privatised State 
owned 
Small Medium Large Industry Services 
CEE  3919 644 421 3546 976 463 2441 2544 5040 746 
Albania 169 16 18 151 38 14 100 103 204 7.6 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
143 37 20 122 58 20 91 109 200 8.2 
Bulgaria 225 43 30 221 47 30 84 214 300 24.1 
Croatia 149 60 26 153 49 33 106 129 236 34.3 
Czech Republic 282 25 30 258 54 25 129 208 343 107.0 
Estonia 164 30 20 161 34 19 67 147 219 11.2 
Hungary 500 73 24 434 115 48 395 202 610 100.3 
Latvia 155 25 23 151 31 21 46 157 205 13.5 
Lithuania 138 36 25 135 45 19 73 126 205 22.3 
Macedonia 150 33 17 147 33 20 72 128 200 5.3 
Poland 834 75 62 726 176 69 613 358 975 241.8 
Romania 473 82 37 386 149 58 410 183 600 73.2 
Serbia and Montenegro 217 41 41 196 62 41 112 187 300 23.9 
Slovak Republic 173 16 24 147 48 18 56 157 220 41.1 
Slovenia 147 52 24 158 37 28 87 136 223 32.2 
           
CIS  2844 811 378 2827 804 396 2090 1937 4058 747.2 
Armenia 225 105 21 277 51 23 244 107 351 3.5 
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Azerbaijan 289 22 37 240 71 37 245 103 350 8.6 
Belarus 260 20 37 229 55 33 133 184 325 22.9 
Georgia 121 54 24 149 34 16 59 140 200 5.1 
Kazakhstan 415 128 40 426 104 53 416 167 585 40.7 
Kyrgyzstan 107 73 28 128 53 21 88 114 202 2.2 
Moldova  221 97 22 222 85 33 205 135 350 2.6 
Russia 457 83 61 398 132 71 247 354 601 582.3 
Tajikistan 106 75 19 123 57 20 88 112 200 2.1 
Ukraine 431 97 58 416 111 59 252 334 594 65.0 
Uzbekistan 212 57 31 219 51 30 113 187 300 12.2 
           
WE  2892 32 38 2301 382 286 1138 1831 2969 3102.2 
West Germany 784 7 20 646 73 92 316 495 811 1572.0 
Greece 538 7 1 440 56 50 164 382 546 202.9 
Ireland 488 7 0 390 76 35 226 275 501 124.8 
Portugal 486 5 14 387 65 53 193 312 505 201.2 
Spain 596 6 3 438 112 56 239 367 606 1001.4 
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Table 2 
Credit rationing 
  
Non-rationed Price rationed Quantity rationed 
Estimation 
sample 
Rejected 
firms 
Ratio of 
rejected to 
quantity 
rationed firms
 
         
CEE 3916 678 14.2% 171 3.6% 4765 127 74.3% 
Albania 164 26 13.2% 7 3.6% 197 6 85.7% 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
161 20 11.0% 1 0.5% 182 1 100.0% 
Bulgaria 235 34 12.1% 11 3.9% 280 9 81.8% 
Croatia 199 12 5.5% 6 2.8% 217 5 83.3% 
Czech Republic 261 41 12.8% 18 5.6% 320 14 77.8% 
Estonia 182 14 6.9% 6 3.0% 202 6 100.0% 
Hungary 472 89 15.6% 8 1.4% 569 7 87.5% 
Latvia 168 17 8.6% 12 6.1% 197 10 83.3% 
Lithuania 152 25 13.2% 12 6.3% 189 5 41.7% 
Macedonia 136 49 25.8% 5 2.6% 190 3 60.0% 
Poland 717 192 20.2% 43 4.5% 952 29 67.4% 
Romania 469 72 12.6% 32 5.6% 573 24 75.0% 
Slovak 
Republic 
186 14 6.9% 4 2.0% 204 2 50.0% 
Slovenia 209 9 4.1% 3 1.4% 221 3 100.0% 
FR Yugoslavia  205 64 23.5% 3 1.1% 272 3 100.0% 
         
CIS 2818 804 21.4% 134 3.6% 3756 104 77.6% 
Armenia 254 59 18.1% 13 4.0% 326 4 30.8% 
Azerbaijan 170 95 33.1% 22 7.7% 287 20 90.9% 
Belarus 202 75 25.6% 16 5.5% 293 11 68.8% 
Georgia 154 23 12.4% 8 4.3% 185 7 87.5% 
Kazakhstan 429 114 20.2% 20 3.6% 563 17 85.0% 
Kyrgyzstan 132 49 26.2% 6 3.2% 187 6 100.0% 
Moldova  247 56 17.8% 11 3.5% 314 7 63.6% 
Russia 425 120 21.2% 20 3.5% 565 15 75.0% 
Tajikistan 131 52 27.4% 7 3.7% 190 7 100.0% 
Ukraine 427 127 22.7% 6 1.1% 560 6 100.0% 
Uzbekistan 247 34 11.9% 5 1.7% 286 4 80.0% 
         
WE  2514 142 5.2% 73 2.7% 2729 7 9.6% 
West Germany 640 48 6.6% 43 5.9% 731 2 4.7% 
Greece 446 25 5.2% 7 1.5% 478 0 0.0% 
Ireland 448 8 1.7% 9 1.9% 465 0 0.0% 
Portugal 411 46 9.9% 8 1.7% 465 4 50.0% 
Spain 569 15 2.5% 6 1.0% 590 1 16.7% 
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Table 3 
The impact of credit rationing in transition countries 
  
Investment 
in fixed 
assets 
Full time 
employment 
growth 
Acquiring new 
technology 
Upgrading 
existing 
products 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Price rationing 
-0.08*** -0.05** -0.04*** -0.03 
(-3.66) (-2.15) (-2.95) (-0.89) 
Quantity 
rationing 
-0.11*** -0.06* -0.08*** -0.11*** 
(-4.11) (-1.83) (-2.84) (-2.90) 
Small firm 
-0.21*** -0.17*** -0.22*** -0.21*** 
(-8.95) (-5.92) (-7.67) (-6.74) 
Medium firm 
-0.06*** 0.01 -0.09*** -0.08*** 
(-3.38) (0.27) (-3.51) (-4.27) 
De novo firm 
0.17*** 0.21*** 0.06** 0.15*** 
(7.56) (5.86) (2.36) (6.03) 
Privatised firm 
0.10*** 0.02 0.03 0.13*** 
(3.09) (0.33) (1.28) (5.04) 
Gov. Subsidies 
past 3 years 
0.11*** 0.03 0.02 0.06 
(3.59) (0.99) (0.58) (1.36) 
Industry 
0.03** 0.07*** 0.17*** 0.11*** 
(2.07) (2.80) (6.84) (4.81) 
N 8402 8295 8318 8402 
Log-likelihood -5431.01 -5505.57 -4975.50 -5642.75 
Notes: Probit estimations, with robust standard errors and clustering of errors by country. Coefficients 
represent marginal effects. Figures in parentheses are z-values. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * 
significant at 10%. 
The dependent and independent variables are all dichotomous. The dependent variables in regressions (1) 
to (4) take the value one if the firm invests in fixed assets, increases its full time employment, acquires new 
technology or upgrades existing products respectively and zero otherwise. Price and credit rationing take 
value one if the firm is rationed, and zero otherwise, with non-rationed firms being the excluded variable. 
Small firms have less than 50 employees, medium firms have 50-500 employees, and large firms are the 
excluded category. De novo firms are those created private from the start and state owned enterprises are 
the omitted category for de novo and privatised. Government subsidies takes value one if the firm receives 
any subsidies from the local or national government and zero otherwise. Industry takes value one for firms 
in manufacturing, mining and construction and zero for firms in transport, wholesale, real estate, hotels and 
others. 
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Table 4 
The impact of credit rationing in non-transition countries 
  
Investment 
in fixed 
assets 
Full time 
employment 
growth 
Acquiring new 
technology 
Upgrading 
existing 
products 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Price rationing 
-0.08 -0.02 -0.07 -0.09 
(-1.29) (-0.37) (-1.24) (-1.41) 
Quantity 
rationing 
-0.04 -0.07* -0.01 0.10** 
(-0.48) (-1.74) (-0.26) (2.29) 
Small firm 
-0.15*** -0.18** -0.23*** -0.27*** 
(-5.73) (-2.42) (-8.36) (-8.72) 
Medium firm 
-0.00 0.02 -0.11** -0.13*** 
(-0.07) (0.38) (-2.55) (-4.49) 
De novo firm 
0.07 0.05 0.16*** 0.04 
(0.89) (1.27) (6.16) (0.24) 
Privatised firm 
0.06 -0.01 0.20* 0.12 
(0.62) (-0.05) (1.83) (0.85) 
Government 
subsidies 
0.09 0.06 0.16*** 0.25*** 
(0.89) (1.17) (4.62) (5.67) 
Industry 
0.05* -0.02 0.11*** 0.03* 
(1.81) (-0.98) (3.41) (1.74) 
N 2659 2650 2649 2659 
Log-likelihood -1486.66 -1598.74 -1559.79 -1698.48 
Notes: Probit estimations, with robust standard errors and clustering of errors by country. Coefficients 
represent marginal effects. Figures in parentheses are z-values. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * 
significant at 10%. 
The dependent and independent variables are all dichotomous. The dependent variables in regressions (1) 
to (4) take the value one if the firm invests in fixed assets, increases its full time employment, acquires new 
technology or upgrades existing products respectively and zero otherwise. Price and credit rationing take 
value one if the firm is rationed, and zero otherwise, with non-rationed firms being the excluded variable. 
Small firms have less than 50 employees, medium firms have 50-500 employees, and large firms are the 
excluded category. De novo firms are those created private from the start and state owned enterprises are 
the omitted category for de novo and privatised. Government subsidies takes value one if the firm receives 
any subsidies from the local or national government and zero otherwise. Industry takes value one for firms 
in manufacturing, mining and construction and zero for firms in transport, wholesale, real estate, hotels and 
others. 
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Figure 1 
(a) The percentage of price rationed firms in total sample as a function of banking 
reform 
 
 
(b) The percentage of quantity rationed firms in total sample, as a function of banking 
reform 
 
 
(c) Asymmetric information as a function of banking reform 
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Appendix 1. BEEPS questions regarding bank finance. 
 
Q46a. Thinking of the most recent loan you obtained from a financial institution, did 
the financing require collateral? (1 = yes, 2 = no, 3 = no loan) 
 
Q46e. What is the duration of the loan in months? 
 
Q46g. On what date was the loan received? (Q46g1 indicates the number of the 
month and Q46g2 indicates the year). 
 
Q47a. If your firm does not currently have a loan, what was the reason? (1 = did not 
apply for a loan, 2 = application was turned down, 3 = application still pending). 
 
Q47b1. If your firm did not apply for a loan, what were the main reasons? This 
question was addressed only to the firms declaring that they did not apply for a loan 
(1 = does not need a loan; 2 = application procedures for bank loans are too 
burdensome; 3 = collateral requirements for bank loans are too strict; 4 = interest rates 
are too high; 5 = it is necessary to make informal payments to get bank loans; 6 = did 
not think it would be approved; 7 = others). Multiple answers are allowed. 
 
Q47c1. If the loan application of your firm was rejected, what were the main reasons? 
This question applied to those firms that applied for loans and were turned down. (1 = 
lack of acceptable collateral; 2 = perceived lack of profitability of the firm; 3 = 
inadequate credit history of the firm; 4 = incompleteness of the loan application; 5 = 
others) Multiple answers are allowed. 
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